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Small and medium enterprises (SME' s) have important limitations from the financial viewpoint. 
Their reduced capability to generate resources (self-financing) and their high financial costs as 
compared to the profitability of investments, makes them highly dependent of short-term bank 
financing. Among the different mechanisms used to solve these financial problems we find credit 
guarantee schemes as the Loan Guarantee Associations (LGA). 
These (mutual or government granted) credit insurance systems were set to facilitate the access of 
SME ' s to the credit market covering part of the loss incurred when borrowers default on a loan. 
In spite of some legal differences, LGA in most European Union countries function in a fairly 
similar way, making therefore easier to compare their operational cost and impact on business. 
This study provides a model for the valuation of the costs and implicit benefits associated with the 
loan guarantee programs. Empirical results indicate that the use of LGA is likely to differ among 
SME ' s depending on company size and debt financial cost. The relatively high cost of the loan 
guarantee, is not always fully compensated with a similar reduction of the interest rates of the 
financing entity, hindering, in many cases, the full development of the schemes. 
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THE ASSESSMENT OF CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES FOR SME's: VALUATION 
AND COST 
1. Introduction. 
Loan guarantee associations (LGA) have a relative long history (1). They have been used in 
most countries in Europe and elsewhere, to stimulate lending for a variety of purposes, but 
most often to help small and medium size enterprises (Levitsky and Prasad, 1987). The primary 
assumption behind these programs is that disadvantage groups, like small and medium 
enterprises (SME), are unable to access formal loans because of credit market imperfections. 
Loan Guarantee Programs are thought to overcome some of these imperfections by allowing 
lenders to shift part of the loan recovery risk to the guarantor (LGA), the risk being typically 
those that can not be secured by collateral furnished by small and new borrowers. In a large 
measure, policy makers see guarantee programs as collateral substitutes for disadvantaged 
borrowers. 
Loan Guarantee schemes are often part of a package of subsidised activities that instead of 
attaching a subsidy directly to the loan -as in directed credit- focus on altering lender behaviour 
by pooling or covering loan-recovery risk. The loan guarantee covers part of the lender's risk 
of not being able to recover loans made to target groups. It is often further argued that once 
lenders have experienced with new clients covered by loan guarantee schemes these clients will 
later be able to graduate by borrowing without subsidised loan guarantees: partly because 
lenders assemble sufficient information about these new borrowers to make loans to them later 
without special guarantees (Vogel and Adams, 1996). 
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The focus of this article is on mutual or government backed loan guarantees schemes to private 
business. The financing of small business through direct loans or as a last resort guarantee for 
loans has became a mayor component of government disbursements to the private sector. 
The objective of the schemes is to induce lenders covered under the guarantee programs to lend 
to individuals and firms they would otherwise not accept as clients. Despite the popularity of 
these programs, there is a dispute about their effectiveness: what is the extent of the supposed 
financial distortions on credit markets they try to solve and how to measure the cost and 
benefits of guarantee loan programs. With the existing tools for a cost-benefit analysis of 
business promotion programs still at a rudimentary stage, a major gap therefore exists in the 
finance and economics literature with respect to the valuation of the costs of these guarantee 
loan programs. 
This study provides a framework for the valuation of the costs associated with loan guarantee 
programs and will try to justify public support to LGA as a second best decision rule, in 
imperfect financial markets. We will develop a valuation model for loan guarantees that 
measures the direct costs of mutual or government-sponsored loans to small business in terms 
of calculating the operating expenses and income generated by the LGA and being charged (net 
of any subsidies) to SME's in relation with the average interest cost savings of the borrowing 
firm. The model can be used for program evaluation where the primary interest is the 
effectiveness of a particular lending program in achieving the anticipated benefits in terms of 
reduced debt costs and additional lending. 
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We will begin our discussion by providing background on loan guarantee programs, and move 
next to a discussion of financial market imperfections and the extent to which loan guarantee 
associations (LGA) can be a solution to these problems. We then focus on the main 
characteristics of loan guarantee programs in Europe, their relative costs and benefits, 
providing a model for cost calculation, and conclude with a few suggestions and remarks 
related to loan guarantees. The application of the model is iIlustrated through a valuation 
analysis of the small business guarantee loan programs of the LGA in Spain, and comparisons 
are being made with similar programs of other European Union countries. 
2.- Capital market imperfections: the background 
Discussions of using loan guarantee programs to overcome market imperfections usually first 
note that there are a variety of imperfections that are said to affect credit markets. Externalities 
and asymmetries with respect to information are among the credit market imperfections most 
often noted and used to justify interventions (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The externalities 
argument is straightforward: externalities arise because valuable information is costly to 
produce but almost costIess to disseminate, so that not enough will be found, because the 
producer cannot capture all the benefits. The asymmetric information argument -basically, that 
borrowers will always know more about their ability and willingness to repay that lenders-
show that interest rate increases can lead to adverse selection (good borrowers wiIl opt out) and 
moral hazard (more risky projects will be chosen) so that lenders may find that it is optimal to 
ration credit rather than increasing interest rates to their "equilibrium" levels. 
Although all firms are subject to the problems associated with capital market imperfections, 
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SME's appear to be particularly affected (Storey, 1994). For instance, small businesses tend to 
be newer, privately owned companies without an established public track record (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994). Due to fiscal reasons or lack of knowledge, SME's often apply incorrectly the 
accounting principles of value to reflect their economic, financial, and patrimonial situation, 
consequently, the information given turns out to be insufficient, biased, and, occasionally, 
unreliable to the lender (2). When this asymmetric information problem is present in the loan 
relationship, it makes difficulty the double coincidence of wants (Caminal, R., 1995) by means 
of which the interest rate should fulfil two main conditions: 
i) the interest rate should be equal or less than the expected outcome of the investment projects, 
on the side of the demand and, ii) to assure an internal rate return that includes both the costs 
of insolvency and monitoring borrower behaviour, on the side of the offer. Binks, Ennew and 
Reed (1992) argue that restricted access to finance is not attributable directly to size, but is 
instead a result of the problems associated with the availability of information from which 
projects are evaluated (3). The interest rate charged by the lending institutions to the SME's is 
larger than the ones charged for large firms because the latter can generate their own 
information, while for smaller firms the information is not always ready available or easy to 
verify. 
Even if the marginal income of the investment projects happen to be greater than the credit 
cost, the credit is often unavailable for SME's because when enterprises are willing to invest in 
high-risk projects with those interest rates, lenders opt to ration the credit to them. There is an 
"equilibrium-price", even when the credit demand exceeds the offer, but when the lenders have 
reached an optimum interest (4), they prefer to grant credit only to a few applicants instead of 
increasing the interest rate (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Keasey and 
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Watson, 1993,1994). 
Loan guarantee programs for SME's has been therefore rationalised on the basis of positive and 
normative considerations. The positive arguments justify public financing support of private 
investment as an efficient response to the failure of private credit market, whereas the 
normative arguments support a wide variety of public benefit arguments such as employment, 
economic diversification, and technological growth (Mensah, 1996). With respect to market 
imperfections, the key theoretical and empirical questions relate to the causes of credit market 
failure, the extent to which it exists in the credit markets, and the effectiveness of government 
loan guarantee programs as market correction mechanisms. 
3.- Loan Guarantee Programs in the European Union. 
Although justifications to loan guarantee programs typically begin with reference to one or 
more financial market imperfections or distortions, there is rarely any further analysis along 
these lines (Meyer and Nagarajan, 1996). Rather, the discussion usually shifts to other types of 
reasons including the assumption that SME are faced with a systematic lack of access to credit 
and, moreover that the economy in general and 5MB in particular would benefit from increased 
access to credit. Given the pervasiveness of this line of reasoning, it seems essential to address 
the issue of the effectiveness and efficiency of loan guarantee programs in providing additional 
credit access and their costs and benefits, regardless of their justification. 
In the European Union (EU) close to 99% of the firms are small and medium enterprises 
(SMB's), of which 94 percent are micro-firms with less than 10 employees, that employ 
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roughly one third of the work force and are also concerned with around one third of total sales 
and almost half global import and export volume (5). 
Given the fact that SME's are the mostly harmed by the effects of these credit market 
imperfections many governments have come up with measures to correct, if not completely 
avoid, the effects of the aforementioned credit rationing. The European Commission (COM 
(93) 528 final) expressed one and again its concern over the difficulties that borrower SMEs 
enterprises encounter in connection with the use of security (6). 
Most countries in the European Union count with some institutional framework to issue 
guarantees that under certain conditions cover the risk involved in loans subscribed by small 
businesses. The purpose of such schemes is to encourage financial institutions to lend to 
SME's, which are either unwilling or unable to provide adequate collateral and although 
several legal and financial reforms to reduce the cost of cover have been introduced lately in 
the management of LGA, there are still some concerns relating credit rationing that remain still 
unsolved. 
Even though they are quite diverse, all national schemes can be reduced down to basically two 
families (7): 
-Mutual 2uarantee-type schemes (MGS), where a (legally private) society grants a guarantee 
in favour of a SME vis-a-vis the loaner (usually a Bank) whereby the former backs the payment 
of the loan (interest and principal) in case of default of the borrower. Strictly speaking, the 
system is deemed mutual when the membership of the guaranteeing society is basically made up 
of SME that benefit from the guarantee under a self-help philosophy. 
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-Public &uarantee schemes (PGS), where a Public Administration grants a guarantee (usually 
through a Guarantee Fund) in favour of a SME in the same conditions as above, although the 
former backs the payment. Application of PGS is usually more limited than that of MGS, as 
they are part of specific publicly funded programs, or apply to specifically targeted markets or 
geographic areas. 
Private schemes of the mutual equivalent type first appeared in countries with a strong tradition 
of guild or craft sectorial organisation in harsh financial times. This is the case of Austria, 
Belgium (mixed), Denmark, France (mixed), Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain 
and Switzerland. Public schemes are more prevalent in countries like Greece, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom and also partially in Belgium and France, although there is often some 
kind of fund or public support or financial backing in many mutual guarantee type schemes (see 
table O. 
The set of basic relations applies to all the different schemes, both public and private. The 
typical guaranteed operation is a loan involving the following agents: 
• 
The borrower, a SME. 
• The lender, a financial institution (a Bank for short) 
• The guarantor (LGA) 
• 
The second-degree guarantor (SDG). 
This fourth agent can be a private, mutual-type society or a public institution (usually a Fund) 
and the way it operates can be very different from one country to another. And it may not exist 
at all. 
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These institutions (LGA) are usually based on a region and some of them are sector oriented -
e.g., along broad branches ofIndustry, Trade. Transportation. It is frequent that they join into 
sectorial, regional or national associations that in most cases perform representative and 
lobbying roles, but in some cases offer certain specialised common services. In Spain all 
guarantee societies set up a specialised society (CERSA) to reinsure collectively their individual 
risks. 
The ties between the LGA and the financial institutions determine the way they operate in 
regard to each other: Some LGA work exclusively with their banks or credit institutions, and 
therefore are perceived as part of the banking sub-system (like in Belgium and France), while 
many other work with any bank (Austrian, German, Italian and Spanish cases). Thus in this 
countries LGA are visioned as a special type of independent financial intermediaries. This 
independence allows them to develop additional services to the benefit of SMEs, e.g., financial 
advising, training, etc. 
The process of approval of the guarantee is connected with the kind of loan application and 
depends on the type of relationship established between the guarantee society and the financial 
institution. It usually starts at the Bank chosen by the SME. After evaluating the circumstances 
of the applicant, the bank may decide that guarantees are needed. If such is the case the bank 
will pass the file directly to the guarantee society and together, bank and guarantee society, will 
or will not approve the operation. The SME may not even get directly in contact with the 
guarantee association (e.g .• in Germany and Belgium) or approach the craft of professional 
association to which it belongs (like in France or Italy). In Spain the process is sometimes 
slightly different. Normally the SME approaches the LGA and once the operation (risk) has 
been approved then it moves to the bank and asks for the desired loan. Hence the bank receives 
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a file that has already been thoroughly analysed. The most active LGA develop strong market 
initiatives to spread their services and be introduced to a larger number of SMEs. 
There are also differences in the proportion of risk covered by the guarantee. In Spain LGAs 
guarantee all the risks of the operation (100%). In the other side Belgium LGAs cover only 
50% of the risks involved (in other words Banks and LGAs) share the risk of the operation in 
equal terms. In France and Germany, the average coverage is around 80%, with LGAs 
ascribed to the Banks network increasing that share towards full 100%. In Italy the situation is 
far more diverse, depending on the agreements with each Bank, although average coverage is 
close to 50%. 
Time required to get the guarantee approved also varies from one country to another depending 
on the type of procedure. Shorter lags occur in Belgium, where less than a week is needed to 
get it approved, given the tight relationship between banks and LGAs. In Spain two to three 
weeks are needed from the moment in which the LGA collect all required information. In 
Germany however the time span is longer, as the standard operation consumes four weeks (and 
up to six weeks depending on its size) from the moment the bank transfers the file. 
3.1 The situation of the LGA in Spain 
Spain included in 1996 around 12 percent of all European SME's, of which 99.8 percent had 
less than 250 employees. These firms have the same financial weaknesses of their European 
counterparts and are, therefore, prone to look for the same solutions in the financial markets. 
These weaknesses can be summarised in the following three points: i) a limited capability to 
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generate their own self-financing resources; ii) expensive debt funding, due to debt costs, 
which are significantly greater for small firms than for larger ones; and iii) the constant 
dependency of financial intermediaries, particularly commercial banks. 
Among the measures usually taken by government to help the financing of SMEs we can 
mention the following: 
- Special lines of financing with subsidised interest rates (8) or backed by the Government in 
agreement with financial intermediaries. In Spain, these lines of credit are channelled through 
the Public Credit Institute (Instituto de Credito Oficial, ICO), which partly belonged to 
Argentaria, at the time, the most important state owned banking group. 
- Public promotion and regulation of financial schemes or firms usually known under the name 
of Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGS) or Loan Guarantee Associations (LGA) aimed at taking 
care of the SME's financial problems (Koning de A. and Snijders, J., 1992). In Spain, the 
LGA take the name of Sociedades de Garantia Reciproca (SGR). The members of these 
associations are, currently, small and medium sized enterprises and regional authorities. In 
1996 Regional Governments controlled more than 50% of all LGA resources. 
These associations were created in 1978, and are regulated by the Credit Companies Discipline 
and Intervention Law, by means of which the LGA are controlled and inspected by the Bank of 
Spain. Nowadays there are 19 LGA, of which only one belongs to a single industrial sector 
(road transportation). The other 18 LGA, issue guarantees to any SME registered in their local 
region. 
There are two kinds of SME members in any LGA: i) SME that are founding members and 
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provide LGA with supporting funds and ii) those participant members that are only potential 
beneficiaries and users of the guarantee system. Basically the system works as follows: the firm 
members of the LGA when asking for a loan or credit in a bank or other financial institution 
present the guarantee of the LGA they belong, which often has the support of a government 
re insurance agency (CERSA), as a second degree guarantor (9). 
The main characteristics of the guarantees supplied by LGA in Spain during the period 
1991-1995 are presented in table 2. We have used data from the Compafifa Espafiola de 
Sociedades de Garantfa Recfproca (CESGAR), the Association that includes all 19 LGA in the 
country. Among their main characteristics, the most important are: 
i) SME's search for medium- and long-term finance. In average terms, between 90 and 95 
percent of applications for guarantees are for operations with more than one-year maturity 
period. 
ii) Contrary to what was expected, and given the fact that the active bookkeeping of assets 
simplifies the formalisation of guarantees, the majority of enterprises that apply for guarantees 
are those in the industrial sector. During the analysed period, these business sector represented 
from 36 to 39 percent of total firms, followed by companies from the services and commercial 
sectors, due, consequently, to their lack of tangible assets to hand in as guarantees. 
iii) Savings & Loan Banks and Private Banks were the guarantees' main beneficiaries with 
about 80 percent of total loan guarantees, in average terms. 
iv) In 1996, around one third of the guarantees provided by the LGA went to new enterprises, 
while the remaining two thirds were provided for technical and asset improvement 
guarantees(10). v) Finally (see table 3), the average interest rate paid by SME's guarantee 
applicants (11.54%) was not significantly different from the one paid by larger enterprises 
(10.80%). During 1995 and 1996, the most recently available years with both data (11), the 
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average interest rates paid by small and medium enterprises were 11.6 percent and 10.3 
percent, and 9.5 and 8.7 percent, respectively. For large companies the debt cost in the same 
period (a benchmark for low risk) was 8.8 and 7.8 (that is a difference of2.8 percent for small-
and around 0.9 percent for medium-size companies). Considering that during those years the 
guarantee cost, in average terms, was around 2.6 percent, this makes LGA backing worthwhile 
for small, but not medium enterprises (12). 
Several legal and financial reforms have been lately introduced in the management of LGA to 
reduce the cost of cover and, as a result, the mechanism of the mutual loan guarantees in Spain 
shifts upwards the average cost of bank borrowing by us much as 1.6% (instead of the previous 
2.6%). On the other side of the balance, it makes borrowing easier (and often even possible), 
although there are still some concerns relating credit rationing that remain unsolved. 
4. Assessing the effectiveness of the LGA. 
As far as we know, no comprehensive evaluation of loan guarantees has been conducted since 
the works of Mintz, Carriere and McCaughey in 1984 and the study of Levitsky and Prasad in 
1987. They concluded that it was difficult to demonstrate that much additional lending occurred 
because of the small and medium business loan programs (Meyer ~d Nagarajan, 1996). 
Subsequent empirical evidence has been concentrated in the role and level of public subsidies 
involved in government guaranteed loans (Rhyne, 1988; Brent, 1991; Mensah, 1996) and 
results have been mixed. 
At lest three important questions should be asked about loan guarantee programs in assessing 
their effectiveness and efficiency in reaching SME: 
• 
• 
• 
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Do these programs significantly alter behaviour in the desired directions? 
Are the costs of these programs less than their benefits? 
Could the resources committed to loan guarantee schemes be used more effectively? 
Usually, three categories of costs accompany loan guarantee programs: the costs of setting up 
the LGA, the costs incurred to run and participate in the guarantee program, and the additional 
cost of funding the program to sustain (defaults) operations (Llorens, 1995) . 
. Set up or acquisition costs: In many cases, establishing a loan guarantee program involves 
setting up a new organisation (LGA), or a new office in an existing organisation to administer 
the program. Typically, donors, industries or governments cover all or most of the costs of 
setting up these facilities. Offices, equipment, employee salaries and associated benefits, and 
the expenses of advertising the program to potential participants are major parts of these set-up 
costs . 
. Operating costs: In addition to the obvious costs incurred in the guaranteeing agency to 
operate its program, lenders and borrowers usually incur additional transaction costs to 
participate in the program, like the opening or study rate (usually paid only once) and the 
maintenance rate (paid every year in proportion to the outstanding risk) . 
. Guarantee fund contribution (GFC): Usually this contribution takes the form of a refundable 
deposit in proportion of the outstanding risk (2 % in France, variable in Italy and as high as 6 % 
in Spain, prior to the 1994 reform). Only the financial cost of this deposit, however, should be 
included in the calculations, in a financially "sound" LGA. 
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Nevertheless, lenders also incur additional costs when they make claims on defaulted loans 
covered by guarantee programs, that must be cover by the guarantee fund. These costs and also 
additional transaction costs may be substantial and can be increased in cases of disputes with 
the guaranteeing agency. With the exception of the administrative and operating costs, a 
disbursement is made only if the loan goes into default and the guarantee is called, thus making 
resource cost of the loan guarantee a contingent obligation. 
The valuation of loan guarantees as contingent obligations has been addressed in the options 
valuation literature. The basis of the valuation of a loan guarantee is that the value of a bank 
loan's risk-free value less the value of a put option written on the assets of the borrowing firm 
and sold to the shareholders of the borrowing firm by the bank. The bank's risk premium is 
reflected in the option premium of the put option allows the shareholders to walk away from 
their obligation to the bank when the company is insolvent. When the government puts in place 
a loan guarantee, the cost of the put option is assumed by the government, thus relieving the 
borrowing firm of the cost of the risk premium that it would have paid for bank financing. The 
cost of the loan guarantee to the government is, therefore, the option premium. For empirical 
work, however, valuation of the put option in a loan guarantee presents some intractable 
problems. When a loan is amortised (as is the case with many government loan schemes), the 
put option is a package of sequential options, each with ,an exercise price equal to the payment 
due on the loan for a particular year. A second problem that is especially severe for small firms 
is how to obtain the market values of the assets of the borrowing firm on which the put option 
is assumed to be written (Mensah, 1996). 
As we have mention, we will try to develop a model for the calculation of the operating costs 
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of the LGA, based on the main charges to the participating firms in most countries of the 
European Union, taking Spain as the baseline case. Although operating and guarantee costs are 
fairly uniform in most countries in the European Union, unfortunately, is very difficult to find 
any evaluation of loan guarantee programs that carefully documented the costs of setting up, 
subsidising, and participating in loan guarantee programs. Among the exceptions, the 
mentioned work of Mintz, Carriere, and McCaughey (1984) analysed the opportunity cost of a 
loan guarantee as being the sum of the cost of default and the operating cost of processing loans 
less any fees charged by government. 
One more way to assess the guarantee cost is to calculate the difference between the internal 
rate of return (IRR) of a loan with and without guarantee (Ubeda, F., 1996). This difference is 
the implicit cost of the guarantee. The loan provided by a bank or other financial institution, 
with the guarantee of a LGA, has to be at least 2.5 percent below market rate for similar 
ungranted loans. 
4.1 A model for the evaluation of the costs of the guarantees. 
LGA have been in existence in Spain for about 20 years, and they have recently seen their 
Legal Regime reformed (Law 111994 and a new administrative procedure). To obtain a 
guarantee SME's have to contribute the following: 
a) fix contributions: which are due when applying for a guarantee and that are 
recovered once the credit is returned to the bank. Its function is to allow LGA to 
arrange for such resources as far as risk of non-payment do exists from the SME's 
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side. The most important contribution, given the mutual character of LGA, is their 
share in the social capital and the Guarantee Fund Contribution (GFC). 
b) Non-recoverable contribution: These are (administrative and operating) sunk costs 
and they do not depend on whether the guarantee is eventually granted or not (opening 
or study rate) or will depend on the size and time to maturity (maintenance rate). 
Table 4 present the guarantee cost's calculations for a given operation (13), which Obviously 
changes when the terms are modified, once the recoverable costs increase along with the 
opportunity costs during the period. The Law 1194 has introduced, among other, a substantial 
modification that affects the guarantee's cost, thus eliminating contributions to the GFC, of 
which 5 percent were derived from the applied guarantee. In the cost guarantee calculations we 
do not include the set up cost of the LGA and re insurance cost as this is provided, between 
certain limits, free of charge by the government agency CERSA. Thus, when the average 
insolvency rate is higher than the 1.25 % of granted credits, penalty will equal the insolvency 
rate minus 1.25% and when the insolvency rate is higher than 2.5%, the penalty will be the 
insolvency rate less 1 per cent. 
As we can see in tables 4 and 4a, the guarantee's cost, according to the redemption's method 
used for the calculations -with fixed quotas- is 1.6 percent, for an operation that requires 10 
million pesetas and with a payment plan of five years. Before present legislation, the 
guarantee's cost was actually of 2.6 percent. 
The guarantee cost has been calculated for loans up to ten million pesetas (or other currency 
equivalents) and with maturities of five years or lower (14). Opportunity costs for members' 
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contributions have been calculated according to nominal interest rates for five years deposits. 
This interest rate includes the expected inflation rates, and this is the only reason why inflation 
has not been considered in our analysis. Divergent inflation rates wiII lead to interest rate 
spreads and eventually to differences in the cost guarantee (15). 
There are currently LGA in seven countries of the EU (see table 5). All LGA present sharp 
differences among themselves in terms of legal status, links with the credit system, government 
support measures, services to enterprises and levels of affiliation. However, in spite of the 
differences shown so far, the LGA way of functioning is rather similar all over Europe and 
although the level of charges for the different services provided may differ significantly from 
one country to another, those differences will be mainly in terms of the government subsidy 
involved in the start-up and guarantee fund and not so much in their ways of operation. 
Based as a starting point on the methodology of tables 4 and 4a, and with the information 
available, calculations of the guarantee cost of the LGA in other than Spain EU countries were 
made. The basic operating costs are shown in Table 6, and will offer an average total cost as 
follows: Belgium (0.9 percent), France (0.4 percent), and Germany (1.5 percent), making the 
use of the LGA usually worthwhile. 
European SME's which participate in the mutual guarantee system assume a guarantee cost that 
is lower than the interest rate differential between short to medium-term operations and 
long-term operations, depending on the incoming information from the data bases of EU 
country members, harmonised through the BACH program (Bank for the Accounts of 
Companies Harmonised). An interesting point that reflects the acceptance degree of the mutual 
guarantee system is that in France and Italy around 30 percent of all SME' s participate in the 
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system, being their guarantee cost the lowest of all analysed countries, in percentage terms 
(16). 
We have up to know assess the relative costs of the use of the LGA programs compared with 
the interest loan savings, although there is still pending the theme of additional access to the 
credit. 
It is not possible however to arrive at definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of loan 
guarantee programs until more careful and comprehensive evaluations are done. There is 
usually expeses too little information on these schemes to determine the costs and specially 
their benefits. As it has been mentioned before "With respect to externality goals, the 
information usually provided by the loan guarantee programs is not enough to conclusively 
state whether LGA loans produce enough benefits to compensate for the subsidy" (Rhyne 1988, 
p.91). 
The difficulty of analysing the impact of credit programs is well understood. To asses the 
impact of loan guarantees it is necessary to estimate the "counter factual,", that is, what would 
the borrower have done without the loan, then compare that with what was done with the loan. 
The counter factual can never be measured directly, so some proxy i~ needed (Meyer and 
Nagarajan, 1996). Most of the benefits generated by a loan guarantee program are concentrated 
in the additional lending induced by the transfer of part of the lender's loan recovery risk to the 
guaranteeing organisation. Both borrowers and society would benefit from the increases in net 
income realised by borrowers who were supposedly more severely credit rationed before the 
help provided the loan guarantee program. Unfortunately, these increases in net income can 
only be proxied by loan recovery performance. Borrowers are more likely to repay loans that 
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help them significantly increase their incomes. Additionally net incomes can only occur if 
additional borrowers receive loans because of the incentives provided to lenders by loan 
guarantee programs. 
The issue of sustainability and subsidies also raises issues for the introduction of new guarantee 
programs. The argument that government lending guarantees resolves a market failure problem 
is often undermined by the large subsidy component and high rate of default among borrowers. 
The subsidies and loss rates in government loan guarantied programs make it necessary to look 
for alternative rationalisations for such programs. One promising approach is to analyse 
government financing of private investment as public investment decisions with private sector 
firms being the instruments of public investment. Stated in these terms, the financing of private 
sector investment can be justified as second best option in an imperfect financial market setting. 
5.- Summary and concluding remarks. 
Credit guarantee schemes are set up with the purpose of covering some portion of the losses 
incurred when borrowers default on loans. The purpose of such schemes is to encourage 
financial institutions, and in particular commercial banks, to lend to small businesses with 
viable projects and good prospects of success but which are unable to provide adequate 
collateral or which do not have a suitable record of financial transactions to prove that they are 
creditworthy (Levitsky and Prasad, 1987). 
Discussions of using loan guarantee programs usually are centred in the need to overcome 
market imperfections. Market imperfections have normally negative impacts on the whole level 
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of investment in the economy as the monetary flows of the credit market are not always 
channelled toward the best and more profitable investment opportunities. 
This market imperfections alone, however, are not a justification for establishing a loan 
guarantee program, as there may be other interventions that are more appropriate (Vogel and 
Adams, 1996). One of the issues is the cost of creating and maintaining the institutions that 
provide loan guarantees (LGA) and the possible importance of the additional transaction costs 
that may be imposed on the lending and borrowing parties by the insertion of an additional 
institution in the credit relationship. The impact of credit guarantees is unclear and there is 
plenty of controversy by both theorist and practitioners. Since most programs are subsidised, it 
is logical to expect that a comprehensive credit guarantee program will be affected by severe 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Many sceptics conclude that guarantees represent 
subsidised credit loans dressed in new clothes (Meyer and Nagarajan, 1996). 
Due the difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of the LGA, perhaps the more efficient way 
of doing this will be to evaluate carefully the performance of a handful of current schemes that 
are nominated by their designers and implementers as being successful. The results of such 
assessment would likely provide a benchmark or upper bound on the performance of most 
credit guarantee schemes. 
This study has presented a model for the valuation in terms of cost-benefit analysis of 
government or mutual loan guarantees programs for SME private investment. The structure of 
the model reflects the notion that, under a guaranteed loan scheme, an investment is undertaken 
using a private firm guarantee (the LGA) as the medium, when the savings in borrowing 
interest rates more than compensate for the costs of the guarantees (as is the case in Spain, and 
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several other EU countries being examined). 
Within the context of the limited literature on guaranteed loan program, this article's 
contribution is twofold. First, it contributes to study of the cost-benefit side of government or 
mutual sponsored loan programs, which most of the existing literature has defined in terms of 
implicit subsidies rather than direct benefits. Second, it introduces a method for recognising the 
cost and calculating the values resulting from the operating expenses of the LGA and the 
contribution for the failure of firm's loans. This methodological contribution provides 
opportunities for enriching the few direct-benefit-oriented studies on loan guarantee programs. 
The article points to several directions for additional research. First, the additionally of a loan 
is based on the assumption that there are no private lenders willing to make the loan in the 
absence of the loan guarantee. To the extent that loan guarantees crowd out private lenders, 
private output is lost. Thus further research is needed to establish the magnitude of such 
crowding out, if any. 
i'Ootes 
1.- In 1917, the first "Societes de Caution Mutuelle" were born in France, and they served as the main basis for the Spanish 
system. In 1929, these societies were regulated in Belgium and they were called "Societes de Caution Mutuelle". After World War 
n, the "Kreditgarantiegemeinschaften" was conceived as an instrument of support for the German economy. In 1973 this concept 
began its development in Italy. In Portugal and Austria this system was introduced recently. 
2.-" .. there are two other agency problems are of particular concern to bankers in the lending to small business: i) wealth transfer 
and ii) 'in kind' compensation. Small firms have considerable operational flexibility, particularly in reacting to changes in 
technology or business conditions. This flexibility makes easy to transfer assets to other uses in response to a changing business 
environment. Finally, owner-managers can increase 'in kind' compensation by manipulating prerequisites, thereby diminishing 
even further the funds available for creditors" (Apilado et aI., 1992). 
3.- Clearly, size and risk may be statistically related. As Storey (1994, p.78) point out "(tlhe fundamental characteristic, other 
than size per se, which distinguishes small firms from large is their higher probability of ceasing to trade.' 
4.- By this it should be understood as such, the interest rate above which the lenders' outcome can be diminished, despite the 
existence of an excessive demand of credit. An increase of the interest rate can double assume that, i) although some borrowers 
might be willing to assume the high cost, the probability of paying back could decrease and, at the same time reducing the quality 
of the lender's portfolio, and that ii) the higher interest rates might be an incentive to invest in high-risk projects with some 
probabilities of big returns, but only when they are successful. 
5.- There is a lack of uniformity regarding the classification of SME's in terms of size (the number of their employees). which 
makes a comparative analysis somehow troublesome. According to different sources, SME's are firms with less than: i) 500 
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employees: Bank of Spain (Central de Balances del Banco de Espafla, CBB£) and the European Observarory for Ihe SME's; ii) 
250 employees: European Union Aids Program5 and Law 111994 (1st Anicle) on Legal Regime of LGA (Loan Guarantee 
Association in Spain); and, finally, Hi) 200 employees: IV Community Directive. 
6.- e.g., in the Commission communication of the financial problems experienced by small and medium-sized companies it is 
stated that "the provision of natio/ral and local govemment guarantees for loans, or the underwriting of pan of the obligations of 
organisations having the same function. has clearly proved its value .. , (alld constitutes) ... a very cost effective exercise ... More 
should also be done to encourage the formation of more Mutual Guarantee Systems. 
7.- Most of the data in this section is based on the European Association of Mutual Guarantees Report and on the draft 
presentation of J. L. Llorens (1995) "Loan Guarantee Systems for SME's in Europe" to the Interamerican Development Bank 
Roundtable on Credit Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean," 
Washington D.C. (both unpublished). 
8.- This has been the main strategy applied by EU countries, but given the fact that the use of this policy is getting harder, the 
policies presently fall within the range of preferred lines of credit's concessions. 
9.- CERSA is a reinsurance company recently created, with the participation of the central and regional governments. It functions 
as a guarantee of the LGA' s operations. 
10.- There is no available data of previous years nor information about the "age" of firm guarantee applicants. 
11.- The economic-financial structure analysis of Spanish SME's is based on the CBBE's 1996 report (last available). This is the 
main data base, even ifit is a source of information biased towards large state owned enterprises. In 1996,73.6% of the total were 
large firms, 19.2% medium, and the remaining 7.2% were small enterprises out of the 5,742 firms that responded to a voluntary 
survey. 
12. Ifwe consider average interest rates during the last eleven years, the spread was 2.5% and 0.7%, respectively (see table 2). 
13.- These calculations are based on Sesto-Pedreira (1994) who made his calculations using a loan redemption system with 
variable quotas to reach an average cost of 1. 7 % for the average guarantee. 
14.- The current average exchange rate is US$ I = ISO pesetas. then the 10 million pesetas will equal USA $66,666. 
15. - If: k = nominal interest rate; k' = real interest rate; f = inflation rate 
(1+k) = (l+k') ( l+f) 
16.- In the case of Italy, the guarantee's cost has not been calculated because the cost of the guarantee depends on the type of 
society that grants them, that is, whether the LGA covers industrial or commercial SME's. Moreover, in both cases the loan 
guarantees are also accompanied by personal guarantees, depending of each particular case, and the contributions vary 
significantly. We have not information about Austria and Portugal contributions. 
23 
References: 
Apilado, V. P. and J. Kent MilIington (1992), "Restrictive loan covenants and risk adjustment 
in small business lending," Journal of Small Business Management (January), pp.39-48. 
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1995), "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small 
Firm Finance," The Journal of Business 3 (July), pp.351-81. 
Brent, Robert, J. (1991), "The cost-benefit analysis of government loans," Public Finance 
Quanerly 19, pp.43-66. 
Binks, M.R., C.T. Ennew and G.V. Reed (1992), "Information Asymmetries and the Provision 
of Finance to Small Firms," International Small Business Journal 11 1 pp.35-46. 
Brewer Ill, Elijah and Hesna Genay (1995), "Small Business Investment Companies: Financial 
Characteristics and Investments," Journal of Small Business Management (July), pp.38-56. 
Caminal, R. (1995), "El Papel de las Restricciones de Credito y las Polfticas Publicas en la 
Financiaci6n de la Pequefia y Mediana Empresa, "Papeles de Economia Espafiola" 65, pp.224-
234. 
Cardone, C. (1996), "Financiaci6n de las PYME y racionamiento del credito: El Sistema de 
Garantfas Recfprocas"; Comunicaciones al III Foro de Finanzas"; Tomo I; pp.302-22; Universidad 
Comercial de Deusto. 
Cardone, C. (1997), "El mercado de credito y las empresas de menor tamaiio"; Informaci6n 
Comercial Espafiola, Revista de Economfa; N° 764; pp.55-64. 
Cardone, C.; Longarela, R.I. and Camino, C. (1998), "Capital Market Inefficiencies, Credit 
Rationing and Lending Relationship in SME's"; Working Paper 9827 (02) Business Economics 
Series; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
Chan, Y.S. and Kanatas, G. (1985) "Asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan 
agreements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 17, pp.84-95. 
Central de Balances del Banco de Espafia, Bank of Spain (1995, 1996). 
CESGAR (1994-95), Compafifa Espafiola de Sociedades de Garantfa Recfproca. Datos del 
Sector. 
Eurostat (1996), "Enterprises in Europe, Fourth Report"; Luxembourg, Office for Officia 
Publications of the European Communities; pg.26. 
Hughes, A. and D.J. Storey (1994), "Finance and the Small Firms", Ed. RoutIedge. 
Jaffee, D. and Russell, T. (1976), "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty and Credit 
Rationing, "Quanerly Journal of Economic Review 91, pp.651-66. 
24 
Jaffee, D. and Modigliani, F. (1979), "A Theory and test of Credit Rationing," American 
Economic Review, 59; pp.850-72. 
Keasey, K. and McGuinness (1990), "Small New Firms and the Return to Alternative Sources 
of Finance," Small Business Economics 2, pp.213-22. 
Keasey, K. and R. Watson (1993), "Small Firm Management: Ownership, Finance and 
Perjomance, " Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. 
Keasey, K. and R. Watson (1994), "The Bank Financing of Small Firms in UK: Issues and 
Evidence," Small Business Economics 6, pp.349-62. 
Keasey, K. and R. Watson (1995), "The Bank Financing of Small Unlisted Firms in the UK: 
An Analysis of Recent Conflicts," Journal of Small Business Finance 4 (2/3) pp. 143-63 
Koning, de A. and Snijders, J. (1992), "Policy on Small-and Medium-sized Enterprises in 
Countries of the European Community," International Small Business Journal 10 3; pp.25-39. 
Llorens, J.L. (1995), "Loan Guarantee Systems for SMEs in Europe," Inter-American 
Developed Bank; (unpublished). 
Mensah, S. (1996), "The Valuation of Government Loan Guarantees: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Perspective," Public Finance Quarterly, 24 (2) April, pp.263-81. 
Meyer, R. and Nagarajan, G. (1996), "Evaluating Credit Guarantee Programs in Developing 
Countries," American Agricultural Economics Association (unpublished) 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Technology (1989), Report on the evaluation of the New 
Ventures Program, Small Business Advocacy Report Nr. 33. Ontario: Ministry of Industry, 
Trade and Technology. 
Mintz, J.M., Carriere, J. and McCaughey, C. (1984), Determining the Subsidy Involved with 
Government Credit Programs: An Application to a Selected Group of Programs. Discussion 
Paper Nr. 256. Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada. 
Musgrave, R.A. and Musgrave, P. (1984) Public finance in theory and practice, 4th ed. New 
York; McGraw Hill. . 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (1990), "An Evaluation of the Loan 
Guarantee Scheme, " Department of Employment, Research paper 74. 
Petersen, Mitchell A. and Raghuram G. Rajan (1994), "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: 
Evidence from Small Business Data," The Journal of Finance 49 (March), pp3-37. 
Rhyne, E. (1988) Small Business, banks and SBA loan guarantees: Subsiding the weak or 
bridging a credit gap. New York. Quorum Books. 
Sesto-Pedreira, M. (1994), "Evoluci6n y desarrollo de las SGR," Perspectivas del Sistema 
Financiero 47, pp.35-50. 
25 
Stiglitz, 1. and Weiss, A. (1981), "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," 
American Economic Review 71, pp.393-410. 
Storey, D.l. (1994), "Understanding the Small Business Sector", Bd. Routledge. 
Ubeda, F. (1996), "Conocer las Vias de Financiaci6n de las PYME-Las SGR," Editorial 
Piramide, pp.79-86. 
Vogel, R.C. and Adams, D.W. (1996) "Costs and benefits of Loan Guarantee Programs," 
Inter-American Developed Bank (unpublished). 
26 
Table 1: Guarantee schemes in Europe 
Country Mutual Guarantee Public Schemes 
Prevalent in Austria, Belgium, Deumark, France, Prevalent the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Gennany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and AL~o avallable in France and Belgium. With much 
Switzerland. Pilot project in Portugal. smaller scope, Greece, Portugal and all other 
countries (program specific). 
AUSTRIA 8 societies regional base. Not atTillated to the European Associations (AECM). Public guarantees also 
avallable through two national Fund~. 
BELGIUM 17 societies. Integrated into AECM. Public guarantees avallable through a National Fond. 
DENMARK 12 societies with strong branch ties. Not atTillated to AECM Small dimension. 
FRANCE 277 societies. AtTillated to AECM. Regional Funds available (nation-wide) managed by SOFARIS. There are 
three separated network~. 
GERMANY 24 societies. AtTiliated to AECM. 
GREECE Public guarantees available but with small dimension. 
IRELAND Public guarantee available (Development Finance Scheme). Small relevance. 
ITALY 573 societies. AtTillated to AECM. Five different network~. 
LUXEMBOURG 2 societies (one for craft~ and the other for trade). Not atTillated to AECM. Small relevance. 
THE Public guarantees available through two Fund~ (one for ri~k capital and one for loans. 
NETHERLANDS 
PORTUGAL Pilot project (one society set up in 1995). Previously public guarantees avallable but with small incidence. 
SPAIN 18 societies. Public guarantees available for special programs. 
SWITZERLAND 10 regional co-operatives for craft~ and 1 nation-wide for industry. 
UNITED Public guarantees available through the Loan Guarantee Scheme. 
KINGDOM 
Source: L1orens, J.L. (1995) "Loan Guarantee Systems for SME's in Europe"; p.4. 
Period of the Guarantees 
less than 12 months 
from 12 and 36 months 
more than 36 months 
Distribution by Sectors 
Industrial 
Tertiary 
Commercial 
Construction 
Primary 
Institutions 
Financial Guarantee 
Savings & Loan Banks 
Private Banks 
Credit Societies 
Other Entities 
State Banks 
Other 
Technical Guarantees 
( .. ) Average period 
Average Loan interest rate 
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Table 2 
Guarantee Characteristics 
(In percentages) 
1991 1992 
5.39 7.88 
12.63 9.56 
81.98 84.54 
38.16 39.22 
27.32 27.72 
18.12 16.89 
9.46 9.99 
6.94 6.18 
87.08 82.82 
54.25 53.59 
25.62 31.68 
7.10 7.74 
6.62 2.73 
6.41 4.26 
NA NA 
12.92 17.18 
62.5 months 65.04 months 
13.60 13.04 
( .. ) Results from the weighting of the period and interest rate of each LGA. 
1993 1994 
7.9 7.92 
9.7 13.20 
82.4 78.88 
37.91 38.01 
27.57 28.56 
17.04 15.96 
IU8 12.77 
6.09 4.70 
89.67 86.41 
46.25 31.66 
30.61 47.41 
6.98 6.45 
1.66 1.25 
3.22 2.45 
11.10 10.78 
10.33 13.59 
NA NA 
NA NA 
Source: Authors' elaboration from Compaiiia Espaiiola de Sociedades de Garantia Reciproca (CESGAR). 
Table 3 
Debt Ratio (OR) and Financial Cost~ (FC) 
Firms' Size 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 Average 
Small-Firms 
(DR) 36.6 37.5 38.9 40.5 40.6 40.6 43.0 41.2 39.1 38.5 37.6 39.5 
(FC) 11.7 12.4 12.8 14.1 15.0 15.9 14.2 13.9 11.8 11.6 10.3 13.0 
Medium-Firms 
(DR) 34.1 36.1 36.7 38.5 38.7 39.9 39.2 37.2 36.4 33.0 33.3 36.7 
(FC) 11.6 11.5 10.7 12.0 13.0 12.9 12.7 12.2 9.4 9.5 8.7 11.2 
Large-Firms 
(OR) 47.2 48.6 48.1 52.1 50.6 52.3 52.8 50.6 49.0 46.2 42.6 49.1 
(FC) 10.3 11.5 11.0 11.5 12.2 11.9 11.3 10.8 8.8 8.8 7.8 10.5 
Source: Our own computation from Central de Balances del Banco de Espaiia data (1996). 
1995 
10.32 
15.54 
74.14 
36.21 
31.35 
15.57 
13.56 
3.31 
84.24 
45.57 
32.14 
6.05 
2.00 
1.60 
12.64 
15.76 
71.13 months 
11.54 
i) Recoverable Contributions 
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Table 4 
Cost of the Guarantee 
a) Share Capital underwriting of the LGA (SC). There is no unifonnity in relation with the share capital to be underwritten. and it 
depends on each LGA. For each underwritten peseta, it could be guaranteed (guarantee amount; GA) between 25 and 200 pesetas 
(Sesto-Pedreira, 1994). At the moment of the guarantee's request. there should be a deposit: 
Considering opportunity cost, 
c = se *GA 
100 
For the assessment of the opportunity cost we apply the average interest rate of five years. A more accurate assessment will be 
possible by applying an estimate interest rate for the following five years. 
ii) Non-Recoverable Contributions 
b) Studies' Expenses (SE). This contribution is to support the studies of the project's viability. and it is 0.5% of the solicited 
guarantee, amount to be deposited in both, whether the guarantee is granted or not. 
E= SE *GA 
lOO 
c) Pending Balance Commission (PBC). Percentage to apply on the pending balance at the end of each year of the loan duration. 
and it depends whether it is a technical or a financial guarantee. Its purpose is to cover the possible insolvency of the endorsed 
partner and will depend on the redemption method of the loan granted by the financial entity. 
iii) Guarantee total cost 
The guarantee's total cost in absolute terms (fC) is equal to the sum of all costs. 
TIle guarantee's average total cost (ATC) is equal to the total cost in absolute terms divided by the sum of the pending balance 
unpaid at the end of period t. TIlis method allows us to calculate it in function of the same amount on which the lender applies the 
interest rate on the pending balances. 
{ erA [(I + i)" -11se)+ (SE)} + PBe ATC=~IO~O ____________ ~ __ __ 
n LBLt 
1=1 
In this example, the ATC will be: 
{ 10,000,000 [(I +0.075}' -lh)+0.5} + (PBC) 
ATC = 100 
5 
'LPBt 
t=1 
.. Loan redemption with fixed quotas (or constant annuities) (fable 4a ). 
ATe = 0.016 = 1.6% 
Year 
1 
2 
3 
n-1 
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Table4a 
Assessment of the Pending Balance Commi'lsion (PBC): Loan redemption with fixed quotas 
The assessment of a constant annuity is: 
Pending Balance to be paid (PB) at the end of period t 
S~ = SVo(l+i)-a 
SV2 = S~(I+i)-a = [SVo(I+i)-aKl+i)-a = 
= SVo(1 + i)2 - a(l + i) - a 
SV; = SV2 (1 + i) - a = [SVo (1 + i Y - a(l + i) - ab + i) - a = 
= SVo(1 + ii - a(1 +i)2 - a(1 +i) - a 
sVn_1 = SV2 (1 + i ,-I - a(1 + ir-2 -K - a(l + i) - a = 
= SVo(l +ir-I -a(Sn_l/i) 
The pending balance at the end of period n is zero. Being: 
Equal to the future value of an annual annuity postpayable. 
S (1 y-I n-Ifi = an-Ifi +1 
The total of the paid commission is equal to the sum of the pending balances per commission rate. 
~~~ ~SVo(1+i)-a]+K +[SVo(1+iy-l- a (Sn_lIi)] 
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TableS 
Loan Guarantee A~sociatioDs in the EU 
Country Number of SME's In the Number of LGA SME's In the system 
country (.) 
Number C •• ) % of total SME's % onGDP 
Austria 188,000 8 5,409 2.87 NA 
Belgium 396,000 17 10,000 2.52 0.2 
France 1,956,000 277 630,000 32.2 1.6 
Germany 2,420,000 24 31,172 1.29 0.2 
Italy 3,243,000 573 914,291 28.20 0.6 
Portugal 626,000 I lOO 0.02 NA 
Spain 2,166,000 19 43,751 2.02 0.2 
Source: (0) Eurostat, "Enterprises in Europe" (1996). 
(0.) European Association of Mutual Guarantees (1994). 
Cost of the guarantee scbemes In several countries 
COUNTRY Affiliation sbare Guarantee fund contribution Opening fee Maintenance fee 
Austria No No 0.5% 0.5% 
Belgium Up to 2% No 0.5% 0.25% 
France ArouodO.1 % 2% No From 0.25 % 10 0.5 % 
Gennany No No 1% From 0.5% to 1% 
Italy Variable Variable Variable From 0.5 % 10 1.5 % on 
(from 5.000 to 10,000 EURO) interest paid 
Portugal 350 EURO No From 0.5% to 1% From 1% 102% 
Spain From 1 % 10 4% No From 0.25% 10 0.5% From 1% 10 2% 
Source: Uoreos, J.L. (l99S) "Loan Guarantee Systems for SMEs In Europe"; p.16. 
